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COMMENTS
AGENCY-FRAuD--No LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL IN DECEIT
FOR INNOCENT MISREPRESENTATIONS OF AGENT
Plaintiffs relied upon certain statements made by defendant's
agents as to the value of the property in the purchase of a bun-
galow. The statements were made innocently but were false
because of defects in the property not known to the agents. The
principal knew of the defects but did not authorize the misre-
presentations, or intentionally keep the agents in ignorance of
the defects in order that they might make false representations
to the purchaser, or even know that such misrepresentations had
been made. Plaintiffs' claim against the principal and his agents
for damages for fraudulent misrepresentations was dismissed.
On appeal to the Court of Appeal, held: appeal dismissed. The
principal's knowledge of defects in his property, in the absence
of any intent to deceive, does not make him liable in an action
for fraudulent misrepresentation for the innocent misrepresen-
tation of his agent.'
This case may settle the controversy created in 1840 by the
case of Cornfoot v. Fowke: in which the court held that the
knowledge of the principal together with the innocent represen-
tation of the agent, in the absence of an intent to deceive on the
part of either, did not constitute fraud. The justices, however,
made it clear in their opinions that the defense would have been
good if the principal had expressly authorized the misrepresen-
tation or had purposely kept the agents in ignorance with the
intention of deceiving the defendant. Then in 1842 the Queen's
Bench held on similar facts that the principal was liable in an
action of deceit.3 Although there was no moral fraud, the know-
ledge of the principal together with the representation of the
agent was held to constitute legal fraud. On appeal to the
Exchequer Division, the decision of the Queen's Bench was set
aside on the grounds that the agent's misrepresentation had not
been relied on by the plaintiff in making the purchase.4 Tindal,
1. Armstrong v. Strain, [1952] 1 All E.R. 139 (C.A. 1951).
2. 6 M. & W. 358, 151 Eng. Rep. 450 (1840).
3. Fuller v. Wilson, 3 Q.B. 58, 114 Eng. Rep. 429 (1842).
4. Wilson v. Fuller, 3 Q.B. 68, 1009, 114 Eng. Rep. 432, 796 (1843).
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C. J., expressly stated, however, that the court had not gone into
the question discussed in Cornfoot v. Fowke, so in this respect
the decision of the Queen's. Bench was allowed to stand.
Thus since 1842 there have been two conflicting views in the
English law, with Cornfoot v. Fowke, although considered the
leading case, receiving especially severe criticism. Not until
1889 was it conclusively decided, in the House of Lords, in
Derry v. Peek,5 that "moral turpitude" was an essential ingre-
dient of fraud and that there was no such thing as legal fraud.
This should have strengthened the decision in Cornfoot V. Fowke
but the point was still considered unsettled in 1936, when a
principal was held liable for misrepresentations made by one
agent, who knew they were false, to a second agent, who inno-
cently related the misrepresentations to the plaintiff., It was
not made very clear in that case whether the first agent was
or. was not guilty of fraud as defined by Derry u. Peek. If he
was not guilty of fraud, then the decision was contrary to
Cornfoot v. Fowke. The Court of Appeal, in deciding the prin-
cipal case, determined, and it would appear rightly so, that
the decision was based on a finding of fraud in the first agent.
With this decision thus distinguished, the court was free to
decide the principal case in accordance with the principal estab-
lished by D erry v. Peek that there must be proof of moral fraud
to sustain an action of deceit.
The holding of Cornfoot v. Fowke has been criticized in the
United States, 7 and it has been said that knowledge possessed
by the principal or thd agent is imputable to either of the two,s
but extensive research has failed to reveal an American case
in point. Although many jurisdictions in the United States
have rejected the doctrine of Derry v. Peek requiring "scienter"
in an action of deceit, the majority of the states still follow it.,
5. 14 A.C. 337 (1889).
6. London County Freehold & Leasehold Properties, Ltd. v. Berkeley
Property & Investment Co., Ltd., [1936] 2 All E.R. 1039.
7. Fitzsimmons v. Joslin, 21 Vt. 129 (1849).
8. Mayer v. Dean, 115 N.Y. 556, 22 N.E. 261 (1889).
9. The jurisdictions following Derry v. Peek have construed the doctrine
of that case to include representations made by one who is conscious of the
fact that he has insufficient knowledge on which to base his representations.
This is well illustrated in Jos. Greenspon's Son Pipe Corp. v. Hyman-
Michaels Co., 133 S.W.2d 426 (Mo. App. 1939), in which the court said:
It is, of course, not necessary, in order to make out a case of fraudu-
lent representations, that the defendant shall have had actual knowledge
that the facts stated by him were false, but instead it will suffice if it
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1953/iss1/8
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The states which have rejected this doctrine can be divided
into at least two groups. In the first group, a defendant is
liable in an action of deceit for an honest misrepresentation on
which the plaintiff has relied and thereby suffered economic
loss, if the defendant has failed to use reasonable care to dis-
cover the truth, or made the representation without reasonable
grounds on which to base a belief in its truth.0 The second
group has gone further than this and has imposed liability in
an action of deceit not only in the absence of "scienter" but
also substantially in the absence of fault.", This is in practical
effect treating the defendant's statement that the fact exists
to his knowledge as a warranty that the fact exists. In addition
to these two groups, several American courts have recognized
the difference in an action of deceit between allowing recovery
when the defendant has a conscious guilty knowledge, and
allowing recovery when he makes a misrepresentation negli-
gently, and have allowed recovery in the latter case not in
deceit but in negligence."
What a court in the United States would decide on the facts
of the principal case is of course a matter of conjecture. Whether
the particular jurisdiction followed or rejected the doctrine of
Derry v. Peek would certainly be an important if not control-
ling factor. Both Tiffany13 and Mechem" feel that there should
be liability on the part of the principal on facts like those of
the principal case. Tiffany believes there could be liability in
an action of fraud and deceit. 5 He admits this would be some-
what of a departure from the requirement of "scienter" but
states that this has been justified on the theory of the "com-
be shown that he made the particular representations with consciousness
that he was without knowledge as to their truth or falsity, when, in
fact, they were untrue.
10. Prestwood v. Carlton, 162 Ala. 327, 50 So. 254 (1909); Whitehurst
Life Ins. Co. of Va., 149 N.C. 273, 62 S.E. 1067 (1908); Houston v. Thorn-
ton, 122 N.C. 365, 29 S.E. 827 (1898). See Bohlen, Misrepresentation As
Deceit, Negligence or Warranty, 42 HARV. L. REv. 733 (1929).
11. National Bank of Pawnee v. Hamilton, 202 Ill. App. 516 (1916);
Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffath, 147 Mass. 403, 18 N.E. 168 (1888) ; Seale
v. Baker, 70 Tex. 283, 7 S.W. 742 (1888) ; Palmer v. Goldberg, 128 Wis. 103,
107 N.W. 478 (1906).
12. Cunningham v. Pease House Furnishing Co., 74 N.H. 435, 69 Atl.
120 (1908) ; Glanzer v. Shepard, 223 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922). See
Smith, Liability for Negligent Language, 14 HARV. L. REv. 184 (1909).
13. TIFFANY, AGENCY § 40 (2d ed. 1924).
14. 2 MCHE M, AGENCY § 1996 (2d ed. 1914).
15. TIFFANY, AGENCY § 40 (2d ed. 1924).
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posite mind." 16 Pollock, as quoted by Mechem, states that the
principal should be liable either in an action for deceit or, as
he says, in a somewhat similar action on the case. 17 The Restate-
ment of Agency 8 would also impose liability on the principal,
but it is not made clear whether the liability should be in deceit
or in negligence.
It is submitted that a jurisdiction strictly adhering to the
requirement of "scienter" as defined by Derry v. Peek would
arrive at the same conclusion as the English Court of Appeal
on the facts of the principal case. On the other hand, in the
American jurisdictions which have rejected Derry v. Peek and
which find fraud on the basis of negligence or warranty, it is
very likely that the principal would have been held liable in an
action of deceit or, in a few jurisdictions, in an action for
negligence. 9
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-NO PENAL LIABILITY OF FATHER FOR
NON-SUPPORT OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
Defendant was charged with being the father of prosecutrix's
illegitimate child. Evidence as to the time of the alleged illicit
relations was conflicting, and defendant disclaimed paternity.
The state failed to establish that defendant ever had had legal
care or custody of the child. In the -trial court defendant was
convicted of non-support of said illegitimate child under section
559.350 of the Missouri Revised Statutes of 1949.1 On appeal
2
16. Ibid., citing Mayer v. Dean, 115 N.Y. 556, 22 N.E. 261 (1889).
17. 2 MwEcHm, AGENCY § 1996 (2d ed. 1914).
18. RESTATEMENT, AGENcY § 256(1) (1933):
A principal who authorizes an agent to conduct a transaction for
him, intending that the agent shall make representations to another in
the course of it which the principal knows to be untrue, is liable for
such misrepresentations as if he himself had made them intentionally;
if, although he does not intend that the agent shall make misrepresen-
tations, he should know that the agent will do so, the principal is liable
as if he himself had made them negligently.
19. See text supported by note 12 supra.
1. Mo. Rrv. STAT. § 559.350 (1949) provides as follows:
If any man or woman shall without good cause, fail, neglect, or refuse
to provide adequate food, clothing, lodging, medical or surgical atten-
tion for his or her child born in or out of wedlock, under the age of
sixteen years, or if any other person having the legal care or custody
of such minor child, shall without good cause, fail, refuse, or neglect
to provide adequate food, clothing, medical or surgical attention for
such child... he or she shall, upon conviction be punished by imprison-
ment in the county jail for not more than one year, or by fine not
exceeding one thousand dollars or by both such fine and imprisonment.
2. State v. White, 243 S.W.2d 818 (Mo. App. 1951).
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